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1. Introduction 
 
 
 A timely development of national infrastructures is a prerequisite for economic growth and is generally associated with significant economic and social returns (Easterly and Servén, 2003). Such undertakings include electricity transmission networks, which following ambitious environmental targets need to connect a growing number of renewable energy facilities. Despite their economic benefits, grid development projects often involve adverse environmental impacts and give rise to community opposition1. Failing to reach agreement on deployment and siting of projects causes lengthy and costly delays to the planning process and even jeopardise the project altogether (Kunreuther et al., 1996; RGI, 2012). 
 
 Although community opposition to major national infrastructure projects is not new, the implications of local resistance for the future development of the sector are on the rise. The context of decision-making in the electricity sector has gradually   shifted   from   one   of   being   a   primarily  technical   matter   to   an increasingly social, environmental, and thus political one. Therefore, the established decision  making  framework  and  processes  for  grid  development seem increasingly unable to effectively engage with more active communities. 
 
 There are three main reasons for this trend. First, the nature of the energy industry has been changing due to the emergence of smaller but more numerous generation facilities, thus increasing their visibility and potential local impact. Second, the public and community awareness and engagement in relation to the energy sector and environmental issues has increased. Third, as the nature of the energy industry and public engagement with grid development has changed, the institutional arrangements within which such policy decisions are made, have not changes. Thus, an innovative approach is required to adapt the decision- making framework to better suit the current and future needs of the sector. 
 
 
 
 1 Apart from transmission grid development, other examples of developments subjected to local opposition include airports, prisons, power plants and linear structures such as pipelines, and railways. 
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From an economic point of view, local opposition can be considered as the result of externalities caused by grid development and imposed on neighbouring communities. Given the standard assumptions of economic rationality, perfect information and zero transaction costs, a solution that internalises the local externalities can, in theory, be derived. With regards to single location facilities, the potential for providing compensation to affected communities is explored in an extensive body of literature, initiated first by O’Hare (1977). 
 
 However, the practical applications of a financial compensation are not trivial, including the difficulty in estimating the exact costs and benefits of the projects and the public perception of compensation as a bribe (Frey et al., 1996). Other measures to foster acceptance and to increase the local retention of profits include the provision of community benefit schemes. These measures are particularly common in wind power developments and have been successfully implemented in countries such as the UK, Denmark and Germany (CSE, 2009; Cass et al., 2010). 
 
 Relative to renewable energy project developments and other single location infrastructure facilities, transmission network developments have received comparatively limited attention from academic researchers (some notable exceptions  include  Ciupuliga  and  Cuppen,  2013;  Cotton  and  Devine-Wright, 2013; Soini et al., 2011). This is particularly the case with regards to compensation or community benefit provision schemes. 
 
 There are some shared characteristics between single location facilities and grid developments, such as large sunk costs, negative externalities, public goods, information asymmetries and similarities in resistance from local communities. However, the technical characteristics and economic regulation of transmission grids necessitate design of innovative approaches to organise local community impact and involvement in grid development. Therefore, there is a need for alternative modes of conceptualising community opposition and engagement with transmission grid development projects (Batel et al., 2013). 
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Drawing from established economic theories and concepts, this paper suggests a new approach based on the environmental sustainability perspective to facilitate a sustainable and more efficient planning and implementation of transmission projects. The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 outlines the economic properties of electricity networks and developments. Section 3 discusses the economics characteristics of community engagement in developments. Section 4 outlines an analytical framework and Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2. Economics of Electricity Networks and Grid Development 
 
 
 Electricity networks are widely regarded as being natural monopolies. This implies that these networks are highly capital intensive and their cost structure is such that the fixed costs are large in relation to the total costs. This feature results in declining average costs as their scale increases. As a result, the provision of a given quantity of output by a single network is more cost efficient than by several competing networks. Consequently, such networks are subject to public ownership or some form of economic regulation. 
 
 Network utilities generally operate under licence agreements that oblige them to connect the generators and end-users in a timely and effective manner. The utilities are also expected to operate the network in a cost efficient manner. In return, the utility can charge the users for the use of network services and earn a regulated return or revenue (Joskow, 2007). The network charges are, in the first instance, accrued to generators and retail suppliers but are ultimately passed to end users through their bills. Many networks in Europe operate under incentive regulation models that reward firms for cost efficiency and penalises high costs (Joskow, 2013). 
 
 The costs incurred by network utilities can be classified into allowable controllable and non-controllable costs. Non-controllable costs are regarded as being beyond the control of the management and are generally treated as pass- through and thus do not affect the profits of the utility. On the other hand, controllable costs are subject to reward and penalty incentives. A cost type or 
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item that is disallowed by the regulator will directly and negatively affect the revenue and profit of the utility. Allowed operating costs can be recovered and allowed investments will earn a specified return (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2001). 
 
 A key objective of the regulator is to maximise the socio-economic welfare of the consumers. Costs that are over and above the efficient level will reduce the net system benefits. Meanwhile, compensations or benefits to local communities become a distributional matter between the communities and the consumers of the frid services as a whole. However, prior to addressing the specific methods and mechanisms for compensation or community benefits, it is important to conceptualise the nature of community level environmental impact and entitlement to compensation in economic terms. 
 
 Transmission lines cross long stretches of land and each new project has a number of stakeholders, including the government, local authority, local businesses, landowners, local communities, and interest organisations. Each stakeholder perceives the grid projects differently and has own view and experience of the decision process. These heterogeneous views and objectives of stakeholders often cause conflict of interest and opposition. Moreover, information asymmetries among the actors can intensify the frictions between stakeholders further as it can induce rent-seeking behaviour and reduce trust between them. Consequently, the economics of grid development can be characterised as also having high transaction costs. Achieving agreements that internalise the externalities caused by transmission projects can become costly to negotiate, especially when the number of stakeholders involved is large (Tobiasson et al., 2014). 
 
 A grid project can be thought of as having two types of costs – i.e. private costs in the form of construction and maintenance costs as well as external costs accrued to third parties. The latter type of costs can include direct economic costs, for example, loss of revenue to owners of agricultural land, and as in the form of negative environmental externalities. The direct economic costs are generally observable and measurable through market prices or compensation methods. 
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For  instance,  there  are  established  norms  and  formulas  for  compensating owners of farmlands for loss of use value of land in terms of lost output and revenue. 
 
 The main difficulty arises, however, when taking the external costs in the form of intrinsic value of environmental amenities accrued to third parties, i.e. affected communities, into account. Grid development projects can be viewed as having an effect on public goods characterised by non-excludability and non-rivalry in consumption. The communities along the new lines enjoy limited or no direct benefits from the development, similar to a new railway passing the community without stopping at the local station. The effects of these externalities such as negative visual, health, and environmental effects as well as financial loss such as reduced property values on local communities translate into reduced utility and economic welfare (Cohen et al., 2014). In the absence of market prices, public goods are implicitly assigned a monetary value of zero and when actions of one agent affect consumption of other users of the public good, there is no simple economic or legal remedy at hand and conflicts arise. 
 
 
3. Economics of Community Engagement in Grid Development 
 
 
 
3.1 The current state 
 
 
 Public and local opposition to new transmission lines is a common cause of delay and can become a barrier to the realisation of future low-carbon systems. Recent cases of conflicts include the Scottish Beauly-Denny line, which was the subject of  the  longest  ever  public  inquiry  in  Scotland  (Tobiasson  et  al.,  2014);  the France-Spain interconnection project, first proposed in 1980 and met by considerable opposition bringing round a second proposal in 2003 and is now expected to be completed in 2014 (Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013); and the Norwegian Hardanger transmission line, which was one of the 2010’s most reported news stories in Norway (Ruud et al., 2011). 
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A  growing  body  of  literature  considers  the  motives  behind  and  discusses possible   measures   to   reduce   community   opposition   to   locally   unwanted facilities. The pejorative label of NIMBY (not in my backyard) opposition is considered as outdated (Burningham et al., 2006) and recent work has revealed a complex heterogeneous composition of opposition2 (Batel and Devine-Wright, 2014; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2013; Johnson and Scicchitano, 2012; Wolsink, 
 2000). However, the research to date is predominantly focused on single location facilities, such as renewable energy generation technologies (Jobert et al., 2007; Wolsink, 2000; Devine-Wright, 2011), as well as waste and hazardous facilities (Johnson and Scicchitano, 2012; Kunreuther et al., 1996). 
 
 Part of the difficulty in addressing the stakeholder conflicts in grid developments lies in the challenge to define, measure and compensate communities for the environmental impacts of the projects. The benefits of most infrastructure facilities are widely spread across the economy, whilst much of their adverse impacts tend to be local. This is also the case with energy generation plants. However, the large geographical span of linear infrastructures often affects multiple communities rather than one host community. Also, due to the complex design  and  technical  nature  of  the  networks,  the  added  system  benefits associated with an incremental network expansion or enhancement project are difficult to define or estimate. In contrast, for energy generation plants the capacities and outputs, and therefore the benefits, are easily measureable in both physical  and  monetary  terms.  Moreover,  identification,  estimation,  and treatment of associated environmental costs also add to the complexity of the decision-making. 
 
 With  regards  to  transmission  development  projects,  the  main  reasons  that trigger public opposition include strong place attachments to the local area; the type, level and quality of communication; lack of trust for the developer and governmental agencies;  harmful  effects  on  health  and  the  environment;  and unconvincing arguments for the need case of the new line and for any beneficial 
 
 
 
 2 Rather than the homogeneous assumptions defining NIMBY opposition. 
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impacts arising from it (Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 
 2013; Devine-Wright, 2013). 
 
 
 In order to increase public trust, reduce stakeholder conflicts, and therefore encourage acceptance of new developments, recent social science research suggests increased information provision as well as more emphasis on communication and community involvement at an earlier stage and in a more deliberative planning process (RGI, 2012; Newig and Kvarda, 2012; Cotton and Devine-Wright, 2012; CSE, 2009). Additionally, Ciupuliga and Cuppen (2013) highlight the role of dialogue in the planning process, which is argued to not only foster social acceptance of transmission developments, but also benefit the project through the access to local knowledge and insights. 
 
 Unlike local communities, landowners tend to be consulted at the initial stages of planning when the optimal route is being identified. Clearly, this is because they possess a legal right to their land and others cannot normally use the land without their consent. In theory, financial compensation is offered at the market rate of the land and should be accepted. In practice, this is not always the case, as seen in the case of Irish gas pipeline project leading to the imprisonment of five landowners refusing the developer access to their land despite a court order (Gilmartin, 2009). However, issues related to landowners are not considered in this  paper  as  each  sector has  established norms and  methods of  addressing direct losses. Rather, the focus of this paper is on the environmental impacts of grid development projects on local communities which are often ignored. 
 
 
3.2 Need for a new perspective on grid development 
 
 
 Although there are some shared characteristics with other energy facilities, the technical and economic features of transmission grid projects are different in several respects and thus require sector specific solutions. For instance, measuring the relevant output of an incremental new line for compensation and benefit  sharing  is  considerably  more  complicated.  Also,  whilst  generation  of 
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electricity from wind power is competitive, electricity transmission networks are natural monopolies and require economic regulation. 
 
 New grid projects are ultimately financed by electricity consumers through transmission fees collected on electricity bills. Thus increasing the project costs through either undergrounding lines or paying compensation is borne by all electricity users across the country. In terms of land-use, transmission lines are linear infrastructures, covering great stretches of land, thus affecting many stakeholders, types of land, land uses, and sensitive areas. Additionally, the physical features of networks complicate matters further as a change in one part of the network will also have an effect on the rest of the system. Consequently, specific benefits of grid upgrades are difficult to identify, quantify, and allocate. Rather than confined benefits of a single line, any upgrade benefits the reliability and security of the network as a whole. 
 
 Figure 1 illustrates the main insights from recent research and the economic characteristics of grid developments. The figure shows the key dimensions and features of community engagement when implementing a new grid project. On the one hand, issues related to private goods with few stakeholders are considered. Decisions are made based on individual preferences, choice and rationale. On the other hand, the issues related to public goods on a social level and rationale is represented. 
 
 The figure identifies two approaches to community engagement with grid projects. Goods, which have private ownership and entitlement, can be considered on an individual level as they involve few stakeholders. Issues on an individual level may therefore be managed through an instrumental approach. The term instrumental refers to a set framework that can be applied in different situations and without much modification. This is the current approach for compensation to landowners for structures placed on their land, for example, through offering a fixed amount per pylon or a wind turbine, dependent on its size or alternatively on its energy produced or transmitted. 
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Figure 1. Dimensions of community engagement 
 
Source: Adapted from Vatn (2005, 419) 
 
 
 
 Conversely, goods which are public in nature and entitlement, and thus must be considered on a social level, i.e. involve many stakeholders, require a collective negotiation approach. When the number of stakeholders is high, and a decision will affect large groups, the importance of communication increases, especially as two-way negotiations. As illustrated by the figure, communication on a collective level is the approach that could be adopted in engagement with communities. This  is  however seldom  the  case,  giving  rise  to  conflicts  (RGI, 2012). 
 
 
 The insights emerging from the literature, the recent research on the diversity of opposition, and the difficulty of applying compensatory measures in practice suggest that there remain many issues to be resolved. Financial arrangements such as compensations and benefit sharing schemes have been suggested as practical measures to  redistribute the costs and benefits of large  projects in order to make the outcome of decision-making more socially acceptable and economically efficient. However, a broader theory-informed approach and conceptualisation of the community engagement with grid development projects is needed to better understand the issues involved and devise structured solutions to resolve them (Been, 1993). 
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4. Towards a Sustainable Grid Development Approach 
 
 
 
4.1 Financial compensation and benefit provision 
 
 
 A common measure to assist the siting of locally unwanted facilities, which has long been the focus of particularly economic researchers, is that of monetary compensation to prospective host communities. This notion was first introduced by O’Hare (1977), declaring it to be necessary for an efficient siting process. More  recently,  Lesbirel  (1998)  find  compensation to  positively  facilitate  the siting of energy plants in Japan while McAdam et al. (2010) argues that failing to compensate the host country of a pipeline is linked to mobilised opposition. 
 
 Community compensation through financial arrangements can in principal be in the form of (i) one-off lump sum payments, (ii) a stream of payments; or (iii) some form of part-ownership. Alternatively, the developers can offer direct investments in the community benefits such as infrastructural upgrades (e.g. new, better roads, increased connectivity such as fibre optic broadband) or other benefits such as tax reductions or reduced energy prices. 
 
 Lump sum payments involve one-off payments to a community fund when the project starts operating. Assuming good management and careful investment the fund could generate continued income. Alternatively, a developer may offer annual payments. In wind power developments in the UK this is normally per megawatt (e.g. £5,000 per MW), linked to the generation capacity or energy output of the project, or a fraction of the revenues generated (CSE, 2009). As mentioned, given the nature of transmission development projects, the output and added benefits of a new line are difficult to determine rendering such measures difficult to implement. Instead a less direct option could be to link the size of compensation to total investments, number of pylons, or perhaps per km of grid length. 
 
 A share in the project can either be provided as a form of compensation from the developer or acquired as an investment (CSE, 2009). In a study conducted in 
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Scotland, Warren and McFadyen (2010) find that local ownership may have a positive effect on public attitudes towards wind farms and Allan et al. (2011) suggests that local community ownership and thus local retention of profits increase the economic impact of wind farms. However, direct application of the instruments used in wind power developments for transmission lines is difficult. For a regulated industry, where profits are generally earned through return on investment in assets rather than through operation, the nature of the risks is different. Additionally, the deposition of the electricity grid and dependency with other parts of the network make it difficult to integrate community ownership of one or part of a transmission line. 
 
 
 On the other hand, Frey et al. (1996) argues that offering compensation to prospective host communities will have a negative effect on acceptance and Kunreuther and Easterling (1990) and Oberholzer-Gee et al. (1995), find no link between  financial  compensation  and  efficient  siting  and  local  approval  of nuclear-waste repositories. Instead, the perception of compensation as a bribe and the crowding out of the feeling of civic duty can increase the opposition to the project. This was shown to be the case in a Swiss study where the rate of community acceptance of a nuclear-waste repository was found to decline, from 50.8 to 24.6 percent, when compensation was offered compared to when no compensation was offered (Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997). 
 
 As a result, rather than using direct financial compensation, Frey et al. (1996) suggests that in-kind compensation, intended to benefit the community as a whole, weakens the bribe effect and thus supports the siting process of locally unwanted  projects.  An  example  of  local  benefit  sharing  is  the  provision  of ‘Community   Benefit   Schemes’.   Such   sharing  schemes,  which  may   contain anything from “good-will” gestures, such as upgrading a road or a new playground, to financial arrangements, such as payments to a community fund or community  ownership,  have  proven  effective  in  increasing  local  support  for wind power developments. This is particularly the case in countries such as Denmark and Spain, where local ownership, and thus greater local retention of 
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profits, are more common (CSE, 2009; Warren and McFadyen, 2010; Allan et al., 
 2011). However, UK communities remain unconvinced of the intentions behind the benefit provision with many still considering it as a method to silent opposition with bribes (Cass et al., 2010). Even well intentioned developers seldom receive the trust of local communities, which may be partially due to the timing of the offered compensation (Aitken, 2010). 
 
 
4.2 A property rights view of grid development 
 
 
 While the communities affected by grid development may oppose the projects, the nature of the community claim on the local environment needs some consideration. The affected communities do not normally have a private ownership right to the landscape in question. Nevertheless, they have the right to the use of their immediate natural environment along with the general public. 
 
 However, if a community have enjoyed the benefits of a public good, such as a landscape or scenery, this can over time give the impression of ownership entitlement or right to these3. Formation of entitlement or rights views is also common in the case of subsidies, licences, or quotas that are renewed for long periods of time. A community can assume or behave as having a property right or private entitlement to local aspects of public goods adversely affected by grid projects and thus the perception of entitlement to property or user rights becomes a central, though subtle, aspect of the opposition to the project. 
 
 Using a property rights view, we can consider a simple form of community compensation payment or benefit receipt to reach a resolution. In order to construct a new transmission line, there are two technical options: An overground line at cost (A) or, at a higher cost, a partially undergrounded cable at  cost  (B).  The  cost  difference  between  the  two  options  is  thus  (B-A)  and 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 3 Note that this view of entitlement and benefit is purely from an economic perspective, opinions of other fields of research, such as environmental phycology, would no doubt differ. 
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undergrounding is assumed to generate project acceptance4. If the general public holds the property rights to the affected landscape, the local communities can be thought as having a WTP (willingness to pay) to avoid the project. This WTP will be equal to (B-A) and to the WTA (willingness to accept) of the general public (or network utility) as they are indifferent between the two options and the project costs to them remain unchanged. 
 
 Alternatively,  the  environmental  property  rights  to  the  landscape  can  be allocated to the affected local communities5. In this case, the community can accept the project through a WTA mechanism. In this case, the society or the developer will have a maximum WTP that is equal to the cost difference between the underground and overground options (B-A), which is also equal to the maximum WTA the communities can achieve. If the communities demand more than (B-A) they will receive nothing as the developer will choose to underground the line. 
 
 Following Coase (1960), the outcomes of the above two cases are equal in terms of economic efficiency as the WTA and WTP will be equal to (B-A). However, depending on the initial allocation of property rights, the distributional effects and the actual or perceived equity implications are significant and crucial from a political economy point of view. For example, the former case may be perceived as unfair that the communities should pay the society in order to avoid the negative impact of the project or have the line placed underground. 
 
 
4.3 An environmental sustainability approach to grid development 
 
 
 The economic approaches to community engagement in grid development based on individual or collective compensation, benefit sharing, and property rights allocation can help reduce community opposition to grid development projects. However, these approaches have, on their own,  methodological and practical 
 
 4 Although this may not be a realistic assumption in real world situations we use this simplified view to illustrate our example. 5 Note that transmission lines may affect other than local residents although not captured by this approach. 
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shortcomings. The main limitation is related to that of identification as well as the lack of clear property rights and assignment of such rights in the absence of clear entitlement to these. In addition, although such approaches could help reduce the level of conflict, they may not necessarily be desirable from an environmental sustainability point of view as they are generally short-term approaches without a sustainability and intertemporal rationale. Therefore, the above economic instruments can be more effective when used within a high level environmental strategy that links the individual and community interests to an overarching social policy and public decision rule and process (see Cain and Nelson, 2013). Given the above reasoning, we propose an economics informed environmental sustainability approach as the basis for a coherent and comprehensive decision framework. 
 
 This alternative economic approach can be explored based around the concept of environmental sustainability and the related notion of intergenerational equity. Within this perspective, the adverse environmental effects of grid projects can be viewed in terms of transformation of natural assets from one form to another. As first suggested by Hardwick (1977) and Solow (1986), the total value of a non- renewable environmental resource can be preserved over time by investing or transforming the benefits or rents from the use of a natural resource into other assets. This transformation can be in the form of strong or weak sustainability. 
 
 In a strong sustainability viewpoint, the total value of a resource or natural asset is to be maintained for current and future generations if an equivalent value of environmental asset can be created from the rents. On the other hand, within a weak sustainability view, some form of financial or social capital (in this case perhaps community capital) of the same value can be created from the benefits of the project. Other possibilities such as transforming the natural asset into physical or human capital can also exist in the spectrum of sustainability options (Ayres et al., 1998; Dietz and Neumayer, 2007). Practical examples of weak sustainability policy in include the sovereign funds in resource rich countries such as the Norwegian Petroleum Fund that invest part of the petroleum proceeds in financial assets. 
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 Similarly,  the environmental impact of a grid development can  be viewed in terms of weak and strong sustainability. If a grid development project is deemed to produce a net socio-economic surplus this implies the project can compensate for the environmental damage of the project. This compensation can be in the form   of   creating   an   equivalent   benefit   or   value   elsewhere.   Within   this framework, the wider society as a whole must decide on the acceptable form of the transformation and conversion of the value of the natural assets affected by grid development while preserving their total value – i.e. whether the natural asset affected should be transformed into another natural asset or into physical, financial, social, or human capital. This decision should be part of a high level and long-term sustainability strategy that informs the decision-making framework, rules, and processes. 
 
 
4.3.1 From compensation and benefit sharing to community investment Compensation of a public nature can be perceived to be fairer and more honest compared to individual monetary compensation and is thus more likely to be successful (Terwel et al., 2014: Frey et al., 1996). However, grid projects have lasting inter-temporal environmental impacts. A weakness of ad hoc and narrow approaches based on compensation and benefit sharing is that they may result in one-off short-term solutions and settlements that do not ensure dynamic and inter-generational equity. Therefore, preserving the value of an environmental asset will often require investment in other assets that produce sustainable long- term benefits. It is, in principal, possible for the society to adhere to a strong or weak sustainability criterion and create ‘community capital’ through ‘community investments’   in   another   form   of   capital.   For   example,   the   Beauly-Denny transmission line project had an element of both strong and weak sustainability; the developers were required to improve the environment along certain sections beyond the effect of the new line. In two cases they were also required to provide financial compensation to affected communities. 
 
 Assigning compensation to individual members of a community is impractical as the  transaction  costs  would  increase  significantly  with  allocating  individual 
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compensation rights. Also, the task of identifying who is entitled to compensation is difficult as there are often no defined criteria. Proximity to the new line may seem  an  obvious  measure.  For  example,  Sims  and  Dent  (2005)  find  that proximity to a transmission line lowers property prices and Gibbons (2014) suggests similar results with regards to wind power developments. However, where the dividing lines for compensation should be drawn is difficult. A more suitable approach is therefore to aggregate compensations and the method agreed on through collective negotiations on a society-wide level. 
 
 
4.3.2 Community investment through collective negotiation 
 As a complement to traditional regulatory approaches, some regulators in North America have used negotiated settlements between utilities and their costumers to determine cost, price and operating projections. Negotiated settlements have proved  to   limit   the  regulatory  workload,   decreasing  delays  and   increase efficiency (Doucet and Littlechild, 2006). Similarly, community investments can benefit from applying the method of negotiated settlement, or here, collective negotiation. 
 Offering investments in community infrastructure or services is common in wind power developments, often labelled as ‘community benefits’. Upgrading roads or recreational spaces gives a developer the opportunity to work directly with the community. Transmission developments involve several communities (rather than one host community which is the case in energy generation facilities) and each community has specific needs that can be identified through participation in the planning process and addressed when developing the compensatory approach. Furthermore, by encouraging the stakeholders to reveal private information about their preferences, negotiations between the developer and the community about the level and type of compensation can increase social welfare. 
 Oberholzer-Gee et al. (1995) find that granting authority to affected communities and  two-way  negotiations,  thus  customer  and  public  participation  in  the planning process, increases local approval of the facilities. Such negotiation will open for innovative solutions that would not have been envisaged by policy makers and developers as local knowledge and needs is utilised, thus increasing 
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the efficiency and welfare effect of the outcome (Doucet and Littlechild, 2006; Ciupuliga and Cuppen, 2013). This is further emphasized by Kunreuther and Easterling (1996), arguing the case for a voluntary siting process and negotiated compensation, rather  than  using  predetermined compensation measures without community influence. 
 Moreover, compensating the communities rather than the individual members reduces the transaction costs low as the number of participants in negotiations is lower. Nevertheless, even when the number of participants is low, negotiations risk the possibility of a breakdown if the parties fail to reach an agreement. In order to reduce the probability of unsuccessful negotiations, an independent authority such as the sector regulator could step in as mediator, which will intervene in case that no agreement is reached. It is, however, in the interest of both parties to reach an agreement as, in case of failure to agree, the regulator can  impose  a  socio-economically  less  favourable  outcome  (Doucet  and Littlechild, 2006). Appointing an ultimate decision maker and arbitrator also limits the appeal of hold up or rent-seeking behaviour as it is less likely that one party to negotiations can uphold the process and rent seeking behaviour. 
 
 
 
4.3.3 Menu of options method for collective negotiations 
 At the presence of uncertainty and information asymmetry it is difficult to form and maintain robust principal-agent relationships. The transaction costs are higher in negotiations, leading to inefficient outcomes. In regulatory economics, the use of a menu of options or contracts is expected to reduce the effect of uncertainty  and  information  asymmetry  (Laffont  and  Tirole,  1986;  Laffont, 1993). Keeping consumer welfare constant, the regulator can offer the firm a choice of different regulatory contracts, which essentially consist of different combinations of cost sharing provisions (a fixed component and a component dependent on the responsiveness of the firm’s revenues to costs). The firm will choose the  optimising contract  depending on  its  cost  opportunities (Joskow, 2007).  Pareto  improvements  are  possible  since  consumer  welfare  is  kept 
 constant and firms can increase their welfare due to the flexibility to choose an 
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optimising contract based on private firm information which was previously unknown by the regulator (Crew and Kleindorfer, 1992). 
 
 A menu of contracts can thus be used in order to elicit information and increase efficiency. Drawing on the theory in regulatory economics, a similar approach may be developed to optimize the provision of sustainability based compensations for transmission grid projects. In this, the developer offers the affected community a set of compensatory measures. The cost of different alternatives can be held constant at a reference cost, for example in the above case at the difference between the cost of an overhead line and an underground cable. Given the knowledge in terms of different compensatory options, a menu of these options may, for example, consist of a choice between community fund payments, infrastructure developments, community ownership, and environmental investments. 
 
 By providing a menu of options, the communities can choose among a set of sustainable solutions that maximizes their welfare depending on their attributes and value to the community. This self-selecting process is preferable since choosing one contract or option is the equivalent of revealing internal information, which would otherwise remain unknown. Thus the process is more efficient than if the developer or the government were to design and implement a policy without consulting the community through collective negotiation within a sustainability framework. 
 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 The electricity networks need to upgrade and expand in order to meet the future demands of the sector, including connecting smaller but numerous conventional and renewable generation facilities. However, many new transmission lines are facing opposition from the affected local communities on the grounds of their environmental impacts. The conflicts cause delays and prolong planning thus adding to the project costs and foregone system benefits. The conventional decision  approaches  seem  unable  to  resolve  many  of  the  conflicts.  There  is 
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therefore a need for a new approach to address the community opposition to grid development projects. 
 In this paper we discussed direct compensation and benefit sharing methods, as well as property rights approaches and how these measures can play a role in reducing community opposition to grid development. However, these methods currently lack an overarching theoretical and methodological framework to structure and guide the process, which is important for gaining the trust and acceptance of communities and society as a whole. 
 We suggest an economic approach to grid development that is based on the concepts of weak and strong sustainability and that the environmental affected by grid developments, rather than the community per se, can be compensated within a sustainability approach. It is however ultimately for the larger society to decide, through public and social policy decision framework, on the nature of the compensation along the spectrum of weak to strong sustainability options - e.g. in the form of lasting investments in environmental, physical, financial, social, or human capital. This compensation can, to an agreed upon extent, accrue to the affected communities, although it is up to the society decide on how and on the level. While financial compensations appeal to the consumer dimension of communities and members as economic agents, compensation in the form of environmental assets appeal to the citizenship dimension of these. 
 The suggested mechanism can be in the form of collective negotiations between the communities and developer with the consent of the regulator and policy makers. The efficiency and acceptance of the outcome of collective negotiations can  then  be  further  improved  through  the  use  of  a  menu  of  options  an established concept in regulatory economics. This paper provides a conceptual framework that unlocks an area of potential empirical research. Future studies should examine the practical application and the process of operationalizing the sustainability approach. 
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